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FROM STATES' RIGHTS BLUES TO BLUE
STATES' RIGHTS: FEDERALISM AFTER THE
REHNQUIST COURT
Kathleen M. Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
The Rehnquist Court dramatically revived the structural principles of
federalism as grounds for judicial invalidation of statutes. For most of the
twentieth century, the federal and state governments had been left to
bargain or fight over their relationship in the realm of politics. The
Rehnquist Court, by contrast, increasingly held that this relationship was a
matter to be refereed in the courts. The Court grounded this approach in the
history of the Founding: "Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our
Nation's constitutional blueprint. States, upon ratification of the
Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal
Government. Rather, they entered the Union with their sovereignty
intact." l In addition, the Court suggested that this relationship required
judicial protection, not mere political self-help: "Federalism was our
Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was
the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities,
one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other." 2
For the most part, the Rehnquist Court's federalist revival restrained the
federal government from incursion upon the states.3 In some lines of
decision, the Court held that Congress had exceeded the scope of its
powers. 4 In others, it held that a federal law had wrongly intruded upon the
sovereign autonomy of the states. 5 Whether enforcing such internal or
external limits on federal power, the Rehnquist Court took significant steps
to rebalance power between the state and federal governments. The Court
revived normative arguments for self-rule at more local levels of
government and found textual and structural bases for vindicating such
* Stanley Morrison Professor of Law and former Dean, Stanford Law School.
1. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (internal
quotations omitted).
2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
3. Term Limits was the rare exception, restraining the states from incursion upon the
federal government by invalidating state-imposed limits upon congressional terms.
4. For a discussion of these lines of cases, see infra notes 10-25 and accompanying
text.
5. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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arguments against assertions of federal power that had gone unchallenged
for decades.
Did these decisions establish a new constitutional order for federalism?
Did they roll back the increasing centralization of social and economic
policy that has characterized American government since the New Deal?
The responses of some critics might suggest so. The Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions sharply divided the Court, typically eliciting 5-4
divisions among the Justices and vigorous dissents. Some observers
denounced the Court for asserting such aggressive judicial supremacy over
Congress. Others expressed concern that revitalized protection of states'
rights would allow the nation to backslide into a patchwork of local
prejudice and tyranny, undermining the federal government's ability to
extend and entrench egalitarian norms. 6
Any such extreme picture, however, is overstated. The Rehnquist Court
surely revived the structural principles of federalism. But it maintained
certain striking limits that kept these principles from bringing about a
greater sea change in constitutional law. The Court did more to change the
constitutional jurisprudence of federalism than it did to realign actual
constitutional power. The question for the future is how much generative
power this jurisprudence will have, for blue states and red states alike.
This essay sets forth this argument as follows. Part I shows how the
Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions had more bark than bite: Each line
of decision was significantly qualified by decisions upholding federal laws
and marking limits to the bold principles earlier asserted. Part II
demonstrates how the Rehnquist Court conspicuously failed to extend the
federalism revival to its logical limits, leaving intact a number of important
lines of cases affording significant scope to federal power over state
governments and state officials. To be sure, the Rehnquist Court enhanced
state power through a number of sub-constitutional lines of cases, issuing
procedural holdings that reduced federal intervention into state government.
But the practical effect of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions has
been overstated by its critics; rumors of the death of the New Deal have
been greatly exaggerated.
Even if the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions did not shift power
from the federal government to the states as dramatically as some have
suggested, those decisions articulated a powerful set of constitutional ideals
and principles supporting checks on federal incursions into state self-rule.
Part III discusses the underpinnings of this new jurisprudence, and suggests
how it has the capacity to transcend traditional political alignments. States'
rights have been associated historically with conservative causes, while
federal power has been associated with increasing egalitarianism and
6. For a review of some of these criticisms, see, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist
Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 367 (2002).
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protection of minorities from Reconstruction through the New Deal and the
Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s. But now that federal power in all three
branches has been consolidated in Republican hands to the greatest extent
since 1954, champions of liberal causes might need to rethink any reflexive
recoil from federalism. Gay weddings in San Francisco and Massachusetts,
like popular initiatives authorizing physician-assisted suicide in Oregon and
medicinal use of marijuana in California, exemplify recent progressive
experimentation at the local level through policies that could not command
a national majority. Under such political circumstances, liberals should
hesitate before rejecting the Rehnquist Court's new federalism. It might
well contain seeds of a constitutional concept of social fluidity that can help
to realize progressive as well as conservative ideals.
I. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S NEW FEDERALISM
The Rehnquist Court developed four lines of cases reviving the principles
of the anti-Federalists at the nation's Founding-principles commonly
referred to in current parlance, somewhat paradoxically, as "federalism." 7
Each line closely divided the Court and each elicited strong criticism from
advocates of federal power. But the practical impact of each of these lines
of cases was limited by decisions setting forth their outer boundary and
leaving significant realms of federal power intact.
The first line of cases reintroduced, for the first time since the New Deal,
judicial enforcement of the limits of power granted to Congress by the
Commerce Clause. 8 In United States v. Lopez,9 the Court invalidated a
federal criminal prohibition on gun possession within the vicinity of a
school, reasoning that gun possession, standing alone, does not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. In United States v. Morrison,'0
the Court invalidated the civil damages provisions of the federal Violence
Against Women Act, reasoning that acts such as date rape or domestic
battery are not economic activities with a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Both decisions declined to defer to congressional
conclusions-in Morrison, conclusions based on quite extensive
congressional factual findings-that a regulated activity has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 11
7. Compare Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 229, 245
(2005) (noting "the Court's recent, and much commented upon, Anti-Federalist 'revival'),
and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 78, 80 (1995) (noting the Court's "dramatic antifederalist revival"), with Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 2180, 2213 (1998) (employing the term "Federalist Revival").
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
9. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
10. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
11. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 ("'[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."'
(quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981))).
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These decisions signaled the end to an anything-goes approach to
congressional commerce power, reviving the theory that enumeration of
powers in Article I is a structural principle warranting judicial intervention
to constrain federal overreaching. These striking new constraints on the
federal commerce power, however, reached their outer limit in Gonzalez v.
Raich,12 which upheld the application of federal controlled substance laws
to the consumption of home-grown marijuana, despite California's efforts
by popular initiative to allow such consumption for medicinal purposes.
The majority reasoned that the principles of federalism did not compel an
exemption from federal law, even for wholly intrastate activities expressly
sanctioned by a state's government, so long as a product grown and
consumed locally is fungible with products sold on interstate markets and
the overall congressional scheme aims at activity that might be thought to
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 13 Only three Justices from
the Lopez and Morrison majorities stuck to their federalist guns, arguing in
dissent that the Court's capacious conception of federal power over
economic activities might well swallow up such wholly local activities as
quilting bees. 14
In a second line of cases, the Rehnquist Court introduced new limits on
Congress's power to enact remedial legislation under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 In City of Boerne v. Flores,16 the
Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act insofar as it
demanded compelling justification from state officials for declining to grant
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. The majority
reasoned that Congress exceeds its civil rights enforcement power if it
enacts remedial legislation that is not congruent with and proportional to a
pattern or potential pattern of constitutional violations by the states. 17 By
identical 5-4 majorities, the Court extended this principle from religious
restrictions to sex discrimination, 18 age discrimination, 19  disability
discrimination, 20 and patent discrimination. 21
12. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
13. See id. at 2197 (reiterating that "the Court need not determine whether respondents'
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding").
14. See id. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)
("There is simply no evidence that homegrown medicinal marijuana users constitute, in the
aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the
national illicit drug market .... ); id. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If the majority is to
be taken seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives,
and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States.").
15. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
16. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
17. Id. at 530 ("While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures,
there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.").
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil damages
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act for lack of congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and finding that the Act did not counteract a demonstrated pattern
of gender bias by state officials).
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These decisions limited federal litigation against state entities even where
the commerce power otherwise authorized federal remedies against private
employers or other parties engaged in similar activities; previous decisions
had held that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity by
exercise of its authority under the Commerce Clause even where that
authority would suffice to regulate private conduct. 22 This escalation of
judicially enforceable limits on federal civil rights remedies against state
entities was qualified, however, by Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs23 and Tennessee v. Lane.24 Each of these cases upheld
the application of federal antidiscrimination laws to the states as justified to
remedy or prevent state civil rights violations-in Hibbs, against working
women, and in Lane, against paraplegics or other disabled people seeking
entrance to state facilities.
A third line of Rehnquist Court cases advanced federalism by limiting the
federal government's ability to commandeer state officers and legislatures
to serve federal ends. In New York v. United States,25 the Court invalidated
provisions of a federal law requiring states that failed to adopt federally
prescribed measures governing disposal of low-level radioactive waste to
take title to such waste, and with title, to acquire any associated liability.
The Court reasoned that the federal government may not coerce state
legislatures to enact federal policy, including by offering them a Hobson's
choice between having to parrot federal regulations or to enact a tax to pay
for waste disposal. In Printz v. United States,26 the Court extended this
holding to limit federal intrusion into state enforcement as well as
enactment of law, invalidating portions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that had required sheriffs and other local law enforcement
19. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating the application to
state officials of provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as
exceeding congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment because
Congress lacked evidence of widespread unconstitutional age discrimination by the states).
20. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating the
application to state officials of provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as
exceeding congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment because
Congress had not found a pattern of discrimination against the disabled by states or state
officials).
21. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (invalidating the application to a state university of patent infringement actions under
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act as exceeding congressional
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, because Congress had found no
pattern of state deprivation of property without due process of law or other deficiency in
available state-law remedies).
22. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
23. 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act as
within the civil rights enforcement powers of Congress because it was deemed to be an
appropriate prophylactic measure against unconstitutional gender discrimination).
24. 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding provisions of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 as responsive to demonstrated unequal treatment of persons with
disabilities in access to state facilities).
25. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
26. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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officials to carry out federally mandated background checks on handgun
purchasers.
While the commandeering line of cases limited the ability of Congress to
conscript state officials-either legislative or executive--directly into
federal policy enforcement, it left them subject to a considerable range of
federal power. The Court's little-noticed decision in Reno v. Condon,27
which upheld federal restrictions in the Driver's Privacy Protection Act on
the release or sale of drivers' license information by states, made clear the
limits of New York and Printz. Condon explained that the federal
government may not tell the states how to regulate their own citizens, but is
free to regulate the states themselves in the same way it regulates private
entities. Thus, for example, if Congress regulates data providers ranging
from telephone companies to video rental stores, it may also regulate data
provision by state motor vehicle bureaus.28
In a fourth novel line of federalism cases, the Rehnquist Court
established the principle that state sovereign immunity limits the power of
Congress, when acting under its Article I powers, to authorize citizen suits
against state governments. Exemplary cases include Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,29 Alden v. Maine,30 and Federal Maritime Commission
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.31 These sovereign immunity
decisions, like the commandeering decisions, derive principally from the
tacit structural postulates of the Constitution, not from the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment. 32 While the Eleventh Amendment prohibits only the
use of federal courts to entertain lawsuits against a state by citizens of
another state, the Court has extended state sovereign immunity also to
federal actions before state courts and federal administrative proceedings. 33
These decisions thus ultimately rely on the proposition that the federal
27. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
28. See id. at 151 ("The [Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)] regulates the States as
the owners of data bases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any
laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal statutes regulating private individuals. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is
consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz.").
29. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereignty by allowing Indian tribes to sue non-
consenting states in federal court for breach of good-faith negotiation over gambling rights).
30. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject a non-consenting state
to suit in state court for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
31. 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (holding that state sovereign immunity precluded the Federal
Maritime Commission from hearing a claim that a port authority run by a non-consenting
State violated the federal Shipping Act of 1984 by denying berth to a cruise ship).
32. U.S. Const. amend XI.
33. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 753 (conceding that the Eleventh Amendment
does not extend by its terms to administrative proceedings but holding that "the Eleventh
Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one
particular exemplification of that immunity").
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government should not be permitted to bankrupt the states without their
consent.
34
And yet here too, the Rehnquist Court drew limits to the principle,
holding, for example, in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz35 that
Congress had authority under the Bankruptcy Clause 36 to subordinate state
creditors to other creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court
circumvented earlier decisions by suggesting that the states had in effect
consented to such abrogation of sovereign immunity by ratifying the
Bankruptcy Clause at the Founding. The Court never wavered, moreover,
from holding that Congress may subject states to citizen suits when
exercising its power under the Fourteenth Amendment, which was enacted
to constrain state power to discriminate. 37
II. THE FEDERALIST ROADS NOT TAKEN
These four lines of federalism cases might seem to have heralded the
biggest comeback for states' rights since John C. Calhoun.38 But the
Rehnquist Court's federalist revival was not as sweeping as it might appear.
As described above, the Court set forth limiting principles to each of these
lines. Even more important, the Court declined to go down four roads that
would have pushed its new federalism much further--despite having the
apparent capacity to round up five votes to do so.
First, the Rehnquist Court never brought back the short-lived principle,
set forth in 1976 in National League of Cities v. Usery,39 that there are
some areas of reserved state autonomy over traditional and integral
governmental functions that are absolutely immunized from federal control.
National League was explicitly overruled a decade later by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.40 The bitter dissents in Garcia
suggested that time and actuarial tables were on the side of the federalists.4 1
But Chief Justice William Rehnquist never cobbled a majority to bring back
the federalist jurisprudence of National League, even though Presidents
34. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-51 (noting sovereign immunity's function of shielding
state treasuries and thus preserving "the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will
of their citizens").
35. 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
36. U.S. Const. art I, § 8.
37. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
38. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 272 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison's views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in
his nullification doctrine-the extreme view that eventually led to the War Between the
States" by suggesting that a state could defect from a federal law it deemed
unconstitutional.).
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding unconstitutional, as an intrusion upon state autonomy
reserved in the Tenth Amendment, a federal statute extending to state employers the wage
and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
40. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
41. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (predicting that the principle of National
League would "in time again command the support of a majority of this Court").
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Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush added five new Justices to the Court,
replacing most of the Garcia majority.
The failure to revive National League arguably renders the Lopez line of
cases somewhat trivial. The majority opinion in Lopez spoke of criminal
law, education, and family law as areas traditionally regulated by the states,
suggesting a faint echo of National League's notion of state islands in the
stream of commerce. But if a traditional state activity does not enjoy
affirmative immunity from congressional regulation, then the Rehnquist
Court's internal limits on Congress's commerce power will provide thin
constraint; it is a relatively small trick for Congress to make adequate
findings that such an activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. If there is any doubt, Congress may simply employ an express
jurisdictional nexus.42
Second, the Rehnquist Court did not overrule South Dakota v. Dole,43
which held that Congress could condition federal highway funding for the
states on their raising their minimum drinking age to twenty-one. The Dole
decision takes a broad view of Congress's ability to use its spending power
as leverage to obtain state commitments to regulation that Congress could
not impose directly. The Court assumed that the Twenty-First Amendment,
which preserves some measure of state autonomy over alcohol traffic,
precluded Congress from directly imposing such a federal regulation in this
area. It also assumed that if the drinking-age requirement were not germane
to the purpose of highway funding, the federal law would impose an
unconstitutional condition. 44 But the Court found teenage alcohol sales
germane enough to highway funding to surmount the unconstitutional
conditions problem, finding a sufficient nexus because, after all, teenage
alcohol sales can cause drunk driving and drunk driving can cause damage
to and require emergency services on the roads. Thus, spending conditions
need only meet the most lenient test of rationality.
The failure to overrule Dole arguably renders trivial the New York v.
United States line of cases. Given the massive scale of federal spending
and the large percentage of state budgets that depend upon federal
subsidies, Congress has considerable leverage over the states through
spending conditions. If, with little judicial oversight, Congress may bribe
the states into enacting the very regulatory programs that Congress may not
42. Indeed, after the decision in Lopez, Congress simply amended the Gun-Free School
Zones Act to provide, "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm
that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce .... 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(2)(A) (2000). This requirement of a jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce
negated the Commerce Clause objection; it could not have negated a reserved state-
autonomy objection had National League been revived and extended from state
governmental operations to state regulatory authority.
43. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
44. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds across a broad range of constitutional
areas that the government may not condition the receipt of a benefit on the waiver of a
constitutional right. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989).
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commandeer the states into enacting or enforcing, then the anti-
commandeering cases can do little as a practical matter to shift power from
the federal government to the states.
Third, the Rehnquist Court did not overrule Ex parte Young,45 which
allowed individual suits against state officials to circumvent sovereign
immunity limits on suits against the states, based on the premise that when
a state official attempts to enforce an unconstitutional law, he is no longer
acting on behalf of the state. While many state litigants have invited the
Court to extend its federalist revival by overruling this decision, it has
continually declined to do so.
The failure to overrule Ex parte Young arguably renders the Seminole
Tribe line of cases trivial by protecting the ability to sue state officials
instead of state governments. Under the state sovereign immunity
decisions, as noted above, one may not sue the state government (in the role
of state government) over alleged harms ranging from patent infringement
to faulty seaport regulations to disability and age discrimination. Under
Young, however, one may still sue state officials in their individual
capacities for alleged violations of federal law. As a practical matter, then,
a considerable range of federal lawsuits may still be brought to constrain
state deviations from federal norms.
Fourth, the Rehnquist Court declined to overrule the judicial implication
of constraints on state regulation under the so-called "Dormant Commerce
Clause." This venerable doctrine protects free trade across state borders by
invalidating state regulations injurious to interstate commerce even when
Congress has not expressly preempted them. The Court presumptively
invalidates facial discrimination by states against outsiders,46 and subjects
even neutral regulations to balancing47 that some Justices have criticized as
standardless and improperly super-legislative. 48 Federal courts thus are
able to strike down a variety of state experiments, including state
environmental laws,49 state antitakeover laws,50 and state laws limiting the
flow of waste and garbage. 51
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing a private citizen suit against the Minnesota State
Attorney General, in his individual capacity, to enjoin him from enforcing then-
unconstitutional state laws regarding railroad rates).
46. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (striking down attempts by New York
and Michigan to permit in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers while
prohibiting out-of-state wineries from doing the same); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951) (striking down a Madison, Wisconsin ordinance requiring that milk sold in the
city be pasteurized locally).
47. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that Pike balancing is "like judging whether a particular
line is longer than a particular rock is heavy" and advocating leaving such legislative
judgments to Congress).
49. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (striking down
a law preventing the export of groundwater out of Nebraska unless the state to which the
water was sent granted reciprocal rights to Nebraska).
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The Rehnquist Court not only declined to roll back the Dormant
Commerce Clause, but also created new judicially implied limits on state
innovations that might interfere with federal initiatives or prerogatives-
limits akin to judicially implied protection of the national market under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. For example, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,52 the Court invalidated state-imposed limits on the duration of
congressional terms. Just as McCulloch v. Maryland53 held that no one
state should be able to tax and potentially bankrupt an instrumentality of the
federal government, so Term Limits held that no one state should be able to
diminish the collective intelligence of Congress by limiting its members'
seniority. 54
Nor does a clearer picture of aggressive states' rights protection emerge
in other areas of the Rehnquist Court's decisions. For example, one might
expect ardent federalist Justices to find consistently that ambiguous federal
statutes do not preempt state law. But the Court's preemption decisions in
fact produced unusual alliances that confounded such predictions. In many
cases, for example, the usual states' rights advocates favored an aggressive
reading of federal statutes to preempt state laws, while the usual federal
power advocates favored upholding state laws.55 Nor did the Rehnquist
Court overrule expansive doctrines of conflict and field preemption that
allow state regulation to be preempted by implication. Thus, it remains
possible for the Court to evict the states from such fields as environmental
or labor regulation even in the absence of a clear statement by Congress that
state regulation is preempted.
These limits on the scope of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution
should not be overstated. The Rehnquist Court returned significant power
from federal courts to state governments in a number of sub-constitutional
lines of decisions. First, the Court established new limitations on the power
of habeas corpus petitions to impose federal constitutional norms on errant
50. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act for imposing tender offer restrictions on interstate securities sales).
51. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)
(invalidating a municipal "flow control" ordinance requiring waste carriers to pass all solid
waste generated in Clarkstown, New York through the city's solid waste processing facility);
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992)
(invalidating a law that prevented St. Clair County landfills from receiving waste generated
outside the county); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 619 (1978) (invalidating a
New Jersey law that prohibited out-of-state "solid or liquid waste" from being imported into
New Jersey).
52. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
54. See generally Sullivan, supra note 7.
55. See id. at 109 & n.217. For a recent example, consider Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacterers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003), in which Justices John Paul
Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg declined to find that Medicaid preempted a
state law threatening Medicaid penalties unless drug companies paid rebates to a state fund
to lower drug prices for non-Medicaid recipients, while dissenters Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Justice Anthony Kennedy would have
found the state law preempted.
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state courts.56 Second, the Court expanded immunity doctrines to protect a
greater range of actions by state officials from federal suit.57 Finally, the
Court diminished the role of "managerial judges"' 58 to supervise state
institutions such as public school systems.59  These lines of cases
substantially removed federal supervision from a range of state
governmental realms. Nonetheless, the Rehnquist Court's shift of power
from Washington, D.C. to the states is more limited in political practice
than the rhetoric of the federalist revival might suggest.
III. FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE: THREE THEORIES
The Rehnquist Court's federalism revival was theoretically deep even if
practically limited. The Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions suggested
two principal theoretical bases for devolving greater power to local levels of
government, one deontological and the other utilitarian. The first,
deontological justification for federalism emphasizes self-rule: the notion
of giving government to oneself. On this view, it is immoral to cede self-
government to a distant bureaucrat in a remote capital rather than engaging
in self-government alongside nearby neighbors. This position implies a
default rule in favor of local power and requires very strong justifications
for federal intervention.
The second justification, based on utilitarianism, takes the view that
different levels of government have different expertise and competence in
serving the general welfare. States are better at solving some and the nation
better at solving other local and national problems. For example, the
federal government can correct market failures that defy state control, such
as regulating externalities like pollution that cross over state borders,
providing public goods like national defense that would have free-rider
problems if provided by the states, preventing races to the bottom that
would occur if the states were left to compete among themselves on labor or
welfare legislation, or providing a larger insurance pool for disasters such
as earthquakes and hurricanes that would swamp local resources. On this
view, state governments will be better at just about everything else because
they are more efficient, more flexible given their smaller scale, and more
responsive to problems that differ across localities. This justification
applies a view of federalism that entrusts neutral technocratic expertise to
56. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (declining to apply a bar on race-
based jury selection retroactively to a case on collateral review).
57. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (extending qualified
immunity to an officer who could reasonably have thought a search lawful under the Fourth
Amendment even if it was not).
58. The term "managerial judges" was introduced in Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding funding increases for
desegregation decrees to be beyond the remedial authority of the lower courts).
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make utilitarian judgments about which level of government has greater
comparative advantage at solving different problems. 60
There is a third theoretical justification for federalism that is not well
developed in the Rehnquist Court cases, but that might well be desirable to
elaborate going forward, especially by those favoring liberal causes. This
theory sees federalism as one among many guarantees in the Constitution
facilitating social fluidity, and preventing the entrenchment of individual
identity. On this theory, liberals should stop singing the states' rights blues
and begin embracing blue states' rights.61
This is so because the traditional federalism paradigm has been inverted
by the entrenchment of Republican dominance of all three branches of
government over the last six years. Under the traditional structural
paradigm, liberals favor federal government while conservatives favor
government by the states. On this view, liberals view the federal
government as an efficient means to correct market failures (as in the New
Deal) and a just means to correct local tyranny (as in the Civil Rights Acts).
At the same time, liberals traditionally view the states as backwaters of
tyranny and discrimination epitomized by Jim Crow laws and continued
resistance to desegregation in the South. On this traditional view, liberals
endorse expansive views of federal governmental power and close checks
on local options for the states. Conversely, under the traditional paradigm,
conservatives view "big government" as the enemy, and the federal
government as presumptively inefficient and unjust, stifling libertarian
initiative and small business under a massive code of environmental,
consumer protection, labor, and safety regulations. State governments, by
contrast, traditionally appear to conservatives both more efficient and more
responsive to the people, justifying, for example, the switch to block grants
rather than formula grants to states during the Nixon and Reagan
Administrations.
But once the Republican Party obtained simultaneous control of the
White House, House, and Senate for the first time since 1954,62 local and
state initiatives began to do more than federal programs to advance
progressive social ends. Gay weddings took place through the executive
60. See generally David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue (1995); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484 (1987)
(book review).
61. Colloquial political parlance routinely refers to the divide between predominantly
liberal "blue" states and predominantly conservative "red" states. See, e.g., Liz Marlantes,
Continental Divide: A Look at America's Polarized Electorate, Christian Sci. Monitor, July
14, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0714/p01 s03-usgn.html.
62. The Republican Party lost both the Senate and the House after the 1954 mid-term
elections under Dwight D. Eisenhower. The 83rd Congress was comprised of a House with
221 Republicans, 213 Democrats, and one independent, and a Senate with fifty Republicans,
forty-nine Democrats, and one independent. The Democrats controlled both the House and
Senate of the 84th Congress beginning in 1954.
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action of Mayor Gavin Newsom of San Francisco 63 and the state
constitutional interpretation of Chief Justice Margaret Marshall writing for
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.64 Oregon pioneered physician-
assisted suicide65 while California experimented with allowing severely ill
patients to use marijuana medicinally. 66 Suddenly states' rights were no
longer just for segregationist southerners. Conversely, conservatives have
sought to transform entrenched control of the federal government into
nationwide social restrictions-from regulating late-term abortion to
limiting stem-cell research-that were once unthinkable at the federal level.
Against this backdrop, it is promising to articulate a third possible
normative premise for federalism-one rooted in a larger constitutional
norm of social fluidity. Social fluidity assumes that each individual has the
freedom to shape and change identity without entrenchment into any fixed
class, caste, nationality, religion, race, or locality. Our nation's lack of such
entrenched national, tribal, or sectarian identity separates us from such
balkanized societies as Belfast, Belgrade, and Beirut, in which national or
religious identity determines all of one's social, economic, familial, and
residential relationships.
The original Constitution contains a number of provisions that support
this notion of social fluidity and that resist entrenchment of identity into
fixed silos that go all the way down, constraining citizens within one group.
The Establishment Clause67 forbids any national union of church and state.
The Titles of Nobility Clause68 forbids the establishment of any aristocratic
caste. In addition, the modem First Amendment has been held to imply a
freedom of association that helps formalize Alexis de Tocqueville's
observation that early nineteenth-century America had substituted ever-
changing voluntary associations for fixed medieval hierarchies of guild and
caste. 69  If the Boy Scouts exclude someone for reason of sexual
63. See Rachel Gordon, The Battle over Same-Sex Marriage: Bush's Stance Led
Newsom to Take Action, S.F. Chron., Feb. 5, 2004, at Al, available at
http://www.sfgate.corn/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/02/15/MNGMN5 1 F8
Q1.DTL.
64. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
65. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (finding invalid the U.S. Attorney
General's interpretation of federal controlled substance legislation to prevent the state-
authorized medical prescription of a controlled substance to assist suicide for the terminally
ill).
66. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause
gives sufficient power to Congress for the federal government to prosecute medical
marijuana users in California, but leaving intact the California law). It is striking that in
Raich, two normally reliable proponents of federalism, Justices Antonin Scalia and Kennedy,
defected to the majority, rejecting a claim of state autonomy-an echo of the larger
phenomenon of surprising new conservative deference to federal power.
67. U.S. Const. amend. I.
68. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
69. 1 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve
trans., Boston, John Allyn 6th ed. 1876) (1835), available at
http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=moa;idno=AHM4083.0001.001 (public
domain).
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orientation, 70 then there remains the option to start an alternative Boy
Scouts instead. 71 Another aspect of social fluidity is physical mobility.
The right to migrate among the states, which itself migrated around the
Constitution before the Court found a home for it in the Citizenship
Clause, 72 guarantees free movement across state boundaries without penalty
for relocation or recency of state citizenship. 73
Federalism, by providing exit options from local repression, provides
similar support to this crosscutting constitutional commitment to social
fluidity. On this view, the answer to local prejudice is exit; a gay person
inhibited by pre-Lawrence v. Texas74 Wyoming laws and social norms in a
rural locale has the freedom to move to more welcoming urban
environments. Federalism provides an opportunity for socially fluid self-
definition according to each locality's different legislative and cultural
environment. Such local norms provide an opportunity for self-definition
and redefinition until a national consensus forms to extend any one local
norm more universally.
This view of federalism as worthy of judicial protection to facilitate
social fluidity is subject to several criticisms. First, it requires a
presumption of strong judicial enforcement to maintain state and local
autonomy from federal prohibitions on such activities as gay marriage and
stem-cell research that fall outside the main purview of regulating the
national market. This cannot please those who favor leaving issues of
structure to the political safeguards of federalism. Second, by allowing
economic decisions to be made at the national level while social decisions
are made at the state level, such a view of federalism might seem to thwart
decentralized economic policies that might allow for progressive local
environmental, labor, antitakeover, and other laws.75 While such concepts
of local economic rule might well be intuitively appealing, they also seem
quixotic given the interconnectedness of a globalized economy. Third,
some people will have more mobility than others to migrate across the lines
that divide red and blue states-consider the gay cowboy who cannot leave
Wyoming because ranching is the only job he knows and he has child
support obligations, or the teenager in Montana for whom there is no in-
state abortion provider. Where such constraints are present, federalism
70. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding the First
Amendment expressive association right to exclude a gay scoutmaster despite state law
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation).
71. See, e.g., Scouting for All, http://www.scoutingforall.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2006)
(describing the "Scouting for All" movement responsive to the exclusion upheld in Dale).
72. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating the durational residency
requirement for receipt of state welfare payments on the ground that it penalized the fight to
equal citizenship among state residents, replacing the equal protection basis for similar
holdings in prior cases).
74. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding Texas sodomy laws to be unconstitutional).
75. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, Dissent, Spring 2005, at 64, available
at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=249 (arguing for a "progressive
federalism" that would promote local regulation of business).
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might appear to maroon some unlucky individuals in distinctly un-fluid
backwaters. The only correction in such situations can be the national
protection of individual rights through federal judicial decision or
congressional exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. But
there is reason to believe that federalist experimentation at the local level
will help promote the ultimate spread of such norms. Massachusetts, for
example, having launched an experiment in allowing gay marriage,
declined the first legislative opportunity to roll back that experiment,
apparently finding the effects of the experiment more salutary than
pernicious.
CONCLUSION
The Rehnquist Court's revival of the structural principles of federalism
has been unfairly maligned as an opportunistic vehicle for freeing gun-
toters, wife-beaters, and other bigots from desirable federal laws. Under
entrenched conservative dominance of all three branches of the federal
government, however, federalism is better seen as protecting blue states and
red states alike-that is, as a potential device for protecting progressive
state and local experiments that advance the ends of liberty and equality.
The Rehnquist Court did less than is often supposed to redistribute political
power from the federal government to the states; its federalism decisions
were qualified on their own terms and never reached as far as they might
have. The Rehnquist Court did more than is often supposed, however, to
redevelop the political theory of federalism, and to remind us of our more
overarching constitutional commitments to social fluidity.
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